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The Invention of a Tradition: Westlake,
The Berlin Conference and
the Historicisation of International Law
In his article “History of an Illusion”, David Kennedy argues that much of
what international lawyers in the 20th Century took to be the predominant
features of 19th Century international law – its philosophical preoccupations
with positivism and natural law and its formalist commitment to sovereignty
– were little more than fantasies projected back to undergird a modern
pragmatic, or progressivist, sensibility constructed to arrive in the form of a
“synthesis” from that carefully designed past. The “modernism, pragmatism
and progressivism of today’s international law” he was to argue “is more
rhetorical effect and polemical claim than historical achievement, and more
part of the internal dynamic of the field’s development than an artefact of a
distant era”.1 Just as the Austinian problematic (how to conceive of a law
ordering the activities of “sovereign” states) seemed to be a fixation more for
20th Century international lawyers than their 19th Century predecessors, so
also the mystification of sovereignty was one “read back” by those seeking to
undergird new institutional initiatives both within and outside the League of
Nations. For Kennedy, the 19th Century history of international law was to be
read in a different register, one that situated the sensibilities of the 19th
Century profession in the same “modernist” frame of the later revisionists – it
was equally “flexible and innovative in its reasoning”, similarly “deferential
to state power” and just as “cosmopolitan”.2
In one direction Kennedy’s attention is focused here upon the essentially
ideological character of traditional international legal historiography, and his
attack upon it may be associated, above all else, with an attempt to displace
the naturalising postulates that appears to underpin contemporary
“pragmatic” thought (characterised by its “centrism”, “flexibility” and its
resort to “balancing principles” such as “reasonable accommodation, reci-
Matthew Craven 1
1 D. Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an
Illusion, in: Quinnipiac Law Review 17 (1997–1998) 99–136, 104.
2 Kennedy (n. 1) 134.
procity and fairness”).3 That the mode for doing so seems to resolve itself in
the articulation of an alternative, more “accurate”, narrative of 19th Century
legal history that displaces the possibility of its subsequent supersession in the
manner described, in some ways detracts from the force of a more general
possible insight: that international legal historiography is always, and routine-
ly, polemical in the sense that the kind of neutrality that might otherwise be
sought in describing the “true” history of international law “in its own
terms”, or for its “own ends”, is one entirely dependent upon a prior
resolution of matters that are fundamentally unstable (such as over the
conditions for legal agency or the identification of relevant sources). At some
point, reflection has to turn towards the conditions of production – the
insights, interests or theoretical frames which the author brings to bear upon
the material that comes to hand – and which, as Croce famously noted, is to
make all historical judgments essentially “contemporary” in character.4
Kennedy’s critique might thus be thought to have been misdirected: seeking
to try to respond at the level of historical truth to a question which might
better have been addressed in terms of its meaning.
Nevertheless, the concern of this paper is not so much with an evaluation of
the kinds of claims Kennedy makes about 19th Century international legal
history, nor indeed with the specific problematic with which he leaves us.
Rather it is to reflect upon the very genesis of the kind of historical reflection
that Kennedy takes as the point of his critique. It is perhaps decisively ironic,
in that sense, that one of the outstanding features of 19th Century inter-
national legal thought was the emergence of a consciousness of its own
historical character. This is not to say, of course, that prior to this time,
international lawyers were unaware of historical precedents or of the contri-
bution made by earlier scholars, whether humanist or scholastic.5 Rather it is
to reflect upon the fact that is was only from the time of Ompteda6 and de
Martens,7 in the late 18th Century that international lawyers begin to envisage
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4 See B. Croce, History as the Story of Liberty (1941) 19.
5 It is possible, of course, to trace earlier instances of this process of historici-
sation, particularly in Pufendorf’s account of the development of natural
sociability. For a discussion see I. Hont, The Language of Sociability and
Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical Foundations of the “Four
Stages” Theory, in: A. Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in
Early Modern Europe (1987) 253.
6 D.H.L. v. Ompteda, Literatur des gesammten, sowohl natürlichen als positi-
ven Völkerrechts (1785).
7 G.F. de Martens, Recueil des Traités (1791–1801). One may also note that
the lack of attention to historical study prior to this time was not confined to
their projects in distinctively historical terms. Here, for the first time, one was
to find accounts of the history of international law as a discipline, and from
this point onwards the now, almost compulsory, “historical introduction” in
textbooks were to start to make their appearance.
The emergence of this historical consciousness, of course, neatly aligns with
the rise, on the one hand, of a rigorous, source-based, methodology that
characterised the newly emergent professional historiography,8 and on the
other, of a “historicist”9 frame of reference (in which all knowledge was
understood to be capable of being ordered within a meta-narrative of social
progress or evolution)10. The point of importance, however, is that what was
bequeathed by the 19th Century is something that had, perhaps, less to do
with the theoretical debates between positivism and natural law, or as to the
structural character of sovereignty and consent, than with the idea that the
essential character of international law was to be understood in historical
terms. This idea, of course, has some bearing upon debates as to the “sources”
of international law (insofar as it invites critical reflection upon claims to
trans-historical truth),11 as it does upon how one might reflect upon notions
of sovereignty or statehood, but it is to suggest that rather than being
formative, such debates are actually symptomatic – produced, as a logical
outcome of a process of placing international legal knowledge within a
specifically historical frame.
In one sense, of course, to speak about international legal knowledge being
historicised is counter-intuitive. The very process of legal argument, after all,
will be one that involves the marshalling of relevant historical sources and
their rhetorical deployment in reference to contemporary conditions. All law
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international law. In 1888 Maitland, the Downing Professor on the Laws of
England was to deliver his inaugural address under the title “Why the History
of English Law is not Written”, in: Collected Papers (1911), i, 480.
8 See L. von Ranke, Theory and Practice of History (ed. Iggers 2010).
9 In Meinecke’s terms, historicism arose primarily out of various critiques of
enlightenment thought in which Vico, Herder and Goethe are at the forefront.
See F. Meinecke, Historicism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook (trans.
Anderson and Schmidt 1972). For a virulent criticism of the idea of historicism
see K.R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (1957).
10 One of the most expressive examples of the frame of reference this invoked is
to be found in Gibbon’s adage that we may “acquiesce in the pleasing
conclusion that every age of the world has increased and still increases, the
real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue, of the
human race”. E. Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1794,
ed. Bury) Vol. 4, Ch. xxviii, 169.
11 See e. g, Ward, An Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of
Nations in Europe (1795) I, iv–xviii.
seems to be about history at one level or another and perhaps has always
been. Yet it is equally evident that the intellectual frame of rule-finding or
policy-prescription also not infrequently involves an effacement of the histo-
rical character of the materials in question and the displacement of
“unnecessary” contextual factors of cause and explanation that might
otherwise be of interest. After all, one need not know much more about the
case of the Caroline, in order to rely upon it, than that it involved a discussion
of the conditions for the exercise of self-defence. In fact, one may go further
than this and suggest that the process of historicising an event – to make
explicit the particularity of the context and explore the specificities of motive
or cause – is to make it all the less relevant as a generalisable experience from
which contemporary legal rules might be deduced. The significance of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, for example, has always been clouded by
the apparent inability to entirely displace the contextual conditions (victors
justice) that appeared to shape their work. But if the historicisation of legal
materials operates, at one level, as a kind of normative block, at another level
entirely, it may also be seen to shape or orient legal knowledge in particular
ways: contemporary initiatives may acquire a character or trajectory precisely
as a consequence of being placed in a certain relationship to experience from
the past. The continued significance of the Naulilaa arbitration, for example,
derives primarily from the sense in which it provides evidence of a form of
politico-juridical movement from an age of reprisals to that of collective
security. The contextual other-worldliness of the historical event is thus turned
from being a facet marking its irrelevance, to a characteristic that endows it
with productive effect through the medium of a trans-historic interpretive
scheme in which notions of “progress”, “evolution”, “development” or
“supersession” come to the fore.12 It is, furthermore, this latter process that
Kennedy identifies to be that of the pragmatic “illusionists” of the 20th
Century, and which rhetorically orients a good deal of policy-oriented legal
reform to this day.
Yet, and this is the key point, once the bridgehead was created – once it
came to be understood that international law had “a history” – there was no
going back. The “flat earth” cosmopolitanism of the humanists, for whom the
poets and orators of Rome had as much to offer as the practice of treaty
making, was not there to be reprised in its own terms, but only as a thin
lineage of cosmopolitan thought straining against the resistance of what was
effectively a materialist critique. All law, all legal relations, had to be under-
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stood, at some level or other, as the products of human acts and agency even if
the object, in some hands, was the identification of trans-historical truths. The
subsequent repudiation of 19th Century legal thought (whether or not one is
to associate it with “positivism” as a method, a philosophy, or indeed a faith),
was thus never going to be achieved in anything less than its own terms – its
temporal displacement arriving in the form, not of a revivified idealism, but of
a new kind of “cosmopolitan materialism” whose analytical frame was that
of a global sociology within which a functional differentiation between fields
of endeavour and levels of agency would be allowed to flourish. It is this
broader frame, with its linguistic correlates of, on the one hand, “community”
and “universality”, and on the other “fragmentation” and “specialisation”,
that provides the shape for international legal thought to this day.
The main focus of this chapter, however, is upon the initial process of
historicisation taking place within the 19th Century, in which the conscious-
ness of international law as being the active product of social agency was
developed. This had, as I hope to show, both social and spatial connotations,
the effect of which was not merely to highlight the contingent character of
legal activity but was also, and simultaneously, to place at centre-stage,
relations with territories in the non-European world. Whereas before, the
non-European world could be perceived as an undifferentiated terrain – as the
incidental locus of legal thought and action – it became the spatial exemplar
of the new temporal ordering of international law. The process by which
international law came to be understood as historically located was one that
resulted in a divided realm of doctrine and practice in which those parts of the
world that partook of that history were divided from those that had yet to
participate in it. The re-description of the ius inter gentes as the public law of
Europe appeared, thus, to be the merest logical expression of this anthropo-
logically-informed historical consciousness. But yet its real meaning was to be
divined only at its limits – at the point at which the European encountered the
non-European, and when international lawyers were faced with the problem
of its transcendence.
The particular medium through which I propose to explore these ideas is
by reference to John Westlake’s response to the events surrounding the Berlin
West Africa Conference of 1884–5. The reasons for this choice are several. In
the first place, the Berlin Conference was clearly a significant moment in late
19th Century international legal and diplomatic relations.13 Whilst historians
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13 For general accounts of the Conference see S. Crowe, The Berlin West African
Conference 1884–1885 (1942); R. Gavin and J. Betley, The Scramble for
Africa: Documents on the Berlin West African Conference and Related
Subjects 1884/1885 (1973); S. Förster, W. Mommsen and R. Robinson
are characteristically divided in how to read it as an event – whether, for
example, it was essentially colonial or anti-colonial in orientation,14 whether
its focus was upon Europe or Egypt rather than Africa,15 whether it was
central to the process of partition or largely superficial16 – its symbolic place
as a marker of the high-point of colonial expansion in the late 19th Century is
hard to avoid. This was certainly the case for the (albeit comparatively small)
community of international lawyers within Europe at the time, whose
attention was drawn to events at Berlin and the attempts made there to
articulate rules governing the acquisition of territory for purposes of regu-
lating the subsequent Scramble.17 For them, Berlin posed something of a
novel problem. On the one hand it offered the opportunity to reflect upon the
intellectual organization of ideas of territorial sovereignty and the content of
rules relating to its acquisition. On the other hand, however, it also brought
into prominence the pertinence of those rules in relation to non-European
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(eds.), Bismarck, Europe and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–1885
and the Onset of Partition (1988); S. Cookey, Britain and the Congo Question
1885–1913 (1968); R. Robinson, J. Gallagher and A. Denny, Africa and
the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (2nd ed. 1981); R. Anstey,
Britain and the Congo in the Nineteenth Century (1962); A. Keith, The
Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act (1919); E. Fitzmaurice, The Life of Lord
Granville (1905) II; R. S. Thomson, Fondation de l’Etat Indépendent du
Congo (1933); P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), France and Britain in
Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (1971); E. Axelson, Portugal and
the Scramble for Africa 1875–1891 (1967); J. Hargreaves, West Africa
Partitioned (1974–1975) I.
14 For a discussion see R. Robinson, The Conference in Berlin and the Future of
Africa, 1884–1885, in: Förster et al (n. 13) 1.
15 See Robinson et al (n. 13) ???.
16 J. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (1963) 337; R. Louis,
The Berlin Congo Conference, in: Gifford and Louis (n. 13) 167;
T. Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa (1991) 254 (“There were thirty-eight
clauses to the General Act, all as hollow as the pillars in the great saloon. In the
years ahead people would come to believe that this Act had had a decisive
effect. It was Berlin that precipitated the Scramble. It was Berlin that set the
rules of the game. It was Berlin that carved up Africa. So the myths would run.
It was really the other way round. The Scramble had precipitated Berlin. The
race to grab a slice of the African cake had started long before the first day of
the conference. And none of the thirty-eight clauses of the General Act had any
teeth. It had set no rules for dividing, let alone eating, the cake.”). What
Pakenham is prepared to admit for the Conference is what he calls the “spirit
of Berlin” (“For the first time great men like Bismarck had linked their names
at an international conference to Livingstone’s lofty ideals: to introduce the
‘3Cs’ – commerce, Christianity, civilisation – into the dark places of Africa.”)
17 General Act of the Berlin Conference, 26th Feb. 1885 C 4361 1885.
territory the demarcation of which seemed to fall outside the territorial
confines of European civilisation.18 One of those who was to struggle with
the theoretical problems that seemed to arise was Westlake, whose Chapters
on the Principles of International Law were organized around this persistent
theme. He was, of course, was by no means the only person writing on the
subject at the time, and in terms of his conclusions he may be said to differ
considerably from a number of his peers. But his work, nevertheless, may be
regarded as acutely sensitive to the theoretical and methodological challenges
that appeared to confront all international lawyers at the time.
The Berlin Conference and its Final Act
As most conventional accounts point out, the immediate origin of the Berlin
Conference was to be found in a series of exchanges between the German
Chancellor Bismarck and the French foreign minister Jules Ferry from April to
October 1884 over the terms of a possible Franco-German entente on matters
relating to overseas territories. The genesis of the proposed entente was
informed, obviously enough, by the Anglo-French rivalry over Egypt (in
which the French feared British control of the Suez Canal)19 and by a series
of disputes between Britain and Germany in relation to Cameroon, Angra
Pequeña, Fiji and New Guinea.20 But there were at least three further forms of
inducement for resort to a multilateral Conference on the subject of West
Africa. The first was an appreciation that European consuls and explorers had
increasingly resorted to open competition in the search to obtain exclusive
treaties of trade and protection with a variety of rulers along “unclaimed”
parts of the coast and within the interior of Africa.21 As was commented in an
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18 See e. g., E. Engelhardt, Etude sur la Déclaration de la Conférence de Berlin
Relative aux Occupations, in: RDILC 18 (1886) 578.
19 On this theme see Robinson et al. (n. 13). For the French, a British strangle-
hold over the Suez Canal would have undermined their plans for expansion in
Indo-China and Madagascar.
20 The Conference also had an obvious role in signifying Germany’s intention to
become a colonial power rival to Britain is also of note. Robinson (n. 13) 8–9.
21 Although Stanley de Brazza Goldie and Nachtigal had all been actively
concluding treaties with native sovereigns, even as late as 1883 there was still
resistance to the idea of the outright annexation of African territory. As
Assistant Under-Secretary Meade noted: “The view of the Foreign Office …
was that England should annex all unoccupied territory between Lagos and the
French settlement of the Gaboon. Now this would be a tremendous under-
taking. We could not annex it without making ourselves responsible for peace
and order there. This would mean a task as heavy as governing the Gold Coast
in a country and climate still severer. We should have to obtain a revenue which
editorial in the Times of 15th September 1884 (with the enduring title “The
Scramble for Africa”), Protectorates “were being announced with such
bewildering rapidity that no map-maker could keep pace”.22 The concern,
in this respect, was the threat of conflict and war. With “Protection” went
tariff barriers, monopolies, and other restraints on freedom of commerce23
such that each instance of a Protectorate being announced was one more
threat to be managed. The second, and related, inducement had been the
conclusion of an Anglo-Portuguese agreement in 1883 the effect of which
would have been to recognize Portuguese sovereignty over the mouth of the
Congo River,24 and which threatened to close off the vast interior of Central
Africa to the merchants, traders and factories of other European States. The
Portuguese claims, much to the consternation of other European powers, were
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could only be obtained by levying customs dues, and I doubt English traders
wishing for this.” Minute by Meade, 28 March 1993. CO 806/203. Robinson
et al (n. 13) 168.
22 The Times, 15th Sept. 1884.
23 As Kasson remarked at the Conference itself “[f]rom the moment when
possession of a Colony does not take for granted its commercial monopoly,
it ceases to have any value for a foreign Government. The revenues which it
would bring in to the mother country would never be equal to the expenses
which its maintenance would require”. Kasson statement, 10th Dec. 1884,
Protocols, Annexe No. 13, 164.
24 The Treaty of 1884 provided for British recognition (subject to the conditions
of the treaty) of Portuguese claims in the Congo between 8º and 5º 12´ South
the inland frontier of which would be defined with the least possible delay.
Subsequent articles provided that the territory in question “shall be open to all
nations and foreigners of all nationality” and that there should be freedom of
movement and commerce (article II). Trade and navigation on the Rivers
Congo and Zambesi should be free (article III) as should it be on all waterways
in the territory concerned. To that end a mixed Commission would be
established to draw up regulations for navigation, police and supervision of
the Congo (article IV) including the establishment of appropriate “super-
visory” charges for goods transhipped across the territory (article V). Roads
were to be kept free and open to all travellers (article IV), protection given to
missionaries or other ministers of religion (article VII), and respect (such as
compatible with Portuguese sovereignty) given to the rights of native inhabi-
tants under Treaties and Engagements with Portugal (article VIII). Tariffs were
limited for a period of ten years to a level of those adopted in Mozambique in
1877 (Britain demanding national treatment for its subjects in this respect
(article IX) and most favoured nation status more generally (article X).
Particular emphasis was given finally to the “extinction of slavery” to which
both High Contracting Parties bound themselves, and both agreed to allow the
other to exercise powers conferred upon them under the Anglo-Portuguese
Slave Trade Treaty of 1842 in Eastern and Southern Africa in cases in which no
local authority is present. For the background see R. Anstey, Britain and the
Congo in the Nineteenth Century (1962) 85.
largely based upon the title of discovery, and its alliance with Britain was
taken to be a way of foreclosing other nations interests in the putative wealth
and riches that existed in the Congo basin. Whilst the British had been forced
to concede that this agreement was effectively dead before the Conference
began,25 its failure was nevertheless indicative of the problems of trying to
approach the question of territorial delimitation through the medium of
bilateral agreements.26 Thirdly, the publication of a promise made to France
by King Leopold, to the effect that the former would have a “right of option”
over the territory possessed by the International Association of the Congo
were the latter to be wound-up, caused a not inconsiderable degree of
consternation, not least as a consequence of enduring doubts as to whether
the Association, as an essentially private body, could claim to enjoy sover-
eignty as a “state”. Its recognition by the United States in April 188427 had
certainly put the issue on the table, but in some degree the real issue turned
upon the question whether the Association could be entrusted with the task of
securing freedom of commerce within the Congo basin on behalf of all
European States.28
In the course of their various exchanges during the summer of 1884,
Bismarck and Ferry settled upon a definitive agenda for the Conference,
circulated to all participants, which was designed to address three matters:
“1. Freedom of commerce in the basin and the mouths of the Congo.
2. The application to the Congo and Niger of the principles adopted by the
Congress of Vienna with a view to preserve freedom of navigation on certain
international rivers, principles applied at a later date to the River Danube.
3. A definition of formalities necessary to be observed so that new occupations
on the African coasts shall be deemed effective.”29
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25 Robinson (n. 13) p. 3 (“Rejected in Paris and Berlin, intrigued against in
Brussels, decried by merchants in Manchester and patriots in Lisbon, and the
Anglo-Portuguese Treaty had been sabotaged by mid-June”). See generally
Anstey (n. 24); Fitzmaurice (n. 13) II 356.
26 Nothing in the formalities of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement required its
acceptance by other parties, but both Britain and Portugal understood that
without such recognition, the agreement would be futile. Granville to Petre,
23rd April 1884, C. 4023, No. 40 (Gavin and Betley [n. 13] 21).
27 See, State Papers, 30, 3. Further, Bontinck (n. ) 200–201; Wack, ???, 79–80.
28 While many States were appreciative of this idea, the British Foreign Office was
deeply sceptical. See e. g. Anderson, “Nature of the King of the Belgians”, 2
March 1884, FO 84/1809, 233–235.
29 See, Plessen to Granville, 8th Oct. 1884, C. 4205, No. 10. The German
Chancellor originally proposed that a congress should guarantee free trade
“in all unoccupied parts of the world not yet legally occupied by a recognized
Power”. Courcel to Ferry, 14th May 1884, DdF, V, No. 270, 289.
The Conference itself took place in the German Chancellor’s palace on
Wilhelmstraße from the 15th November 1884 to the 26th February 1885. It
was attended by 14 states including every European power with the exception
of Switzerland, and with the presence also of the US30 and Turkey.31 There
was no official place for the International Association of the Congo, nor for
the Sultanate of Zanzibar or any other African sovereign. The work of the
Conference was conducted over ten plenary sessions and was divided into two
phases, the first of which ran from 15th November to 22nd December 1884,
the second from the 5th January until the 26th February. Much of its work was
also undertaken by specialised Commissions which reported back regularly to
the plenary.
The outcome of the Conference was the conclusion of a General Act signed
and ratified by all participants with the exception of the USA.32 It was also
signed and ratified by the Congo Free State (the recognition of which had
been secured by another set of treaties between the International Association
of the Congo and participating States which were appended to the General
Act)33 and by Zanzibar.34 The overt purpose of the General Act was to secure
“the development of trade and civilization in certain regions in Africa” at the
same time as obviating “the misunderstanding and disputes which might in
future arise from new acts of occupation (‘prises de possession’) on the coast
of Africa”.35 It comprised of 38 articles contained within seven Chapters, four
of which contained “Declarations” on various substantive topics, two Acts of
Navigation (relating to the Congo and Niger respectively) and a final chapter
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30 The US reserved the right to decline to accept the conclusions of the
Conference. NAW, Dept State Diplomatic Instructions Germany, vol. 17, ff.
414–415; in Bontinck (n. 27) 225
31 France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, Portugal, Spain, the
United States, Austria, Russia, Italy, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, Turkey.
32 Schmitt comments pithily that the United States “demonstrated a mixture of
absence in principle and presence in practice”. C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the
Earth (2003) 217.
33 Protocol IX, Annex I. E. Hertslet, A map of Africa by treaty(3rd ed. 1967), I,
221–226 (Great Britain); 227–228 (Italy); 21–25 (Austria); 230–231 (Nether-
lands); 240–241 (Spain); 239 (Russia); 242–243 (Sweden and Norway); 205–
206 (Denmark); 196–197 (Belgium).
34 Hertslet (n. 33) I, No. 49, 314. The act of adhesion, however, contained a
reservation to the effect that “shall not entail or shall not be supposed to signify
his acceptance of the principle of free trade”. Once placed under a British
Protectorate, however, the reservation was withdrawn by Britain on the 22nd
June 1892. Hertslet (n. 33) I, No. 46, 312.
35 General Act, preamble. Hertslet (n. 33) II, No. 128, 468.
which dealt with “General Dispositions” relating to modification, signature
and ratification.36
Leaving aside the navigation provisions (which were modelled on those for
the Danube)37 the key features of the General Act were fourfold.38 First it
established a regime of free trade in an area that stretched across the centre of
Africa encompassing, at its centre, the “hydrographic” basin of the Congo
and which was extended, for purposes of the Act, to the Eastern and Western
seaboards of the Continent. Any power exercising sovereign rights in relation
to such territory would be prohibited from establishing monopolies of any
kind39 and goods were to be free of all import and transit duties40 and subject
only to such taxation as might be levied “as fair compensation for expendi-
ture in the interest of trade”.41 Secondly, the powers bound themselves to
“watch over the preservation of the native tribes and to care for the im-
provement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being”42 and
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36 Chapter I, Declaration relative to Freedom of Trade in the Basin of the Congo,
its Mouths and circumjacent Regions, with other Provisions connected there-
with (articles I–VIII); Chapter II, Declaration Relative to the Slave Trade
(article IX); Chapter III, Declaration Relative to the Neutrality of the Ter-
ritories Comprised in the Conventional Basin of the Congo (articles X–XII);
Chapter IV, Act of Navigation for the Congo (articles XIII–XXV); Chapter V,
Act of Navigation for the Niger (articles XXVI–XXXIII); Declaration Relative
to the Essential Conditions to be Observed in Order that new Occupations of
the Coasts of the African Continent may be held to be Effective (articles
XXXIV–XXXV); Chapter VI, Declaration Relative to the essential Conditions
to be observed in order that new Occupations on the Coasts of the African
Continent may be held to be effective; Chapter VII, General Dispositions.
37 The regime for the Niger, however, did not envisage the establishment of a river
commission. The river commission for the Congo was never established.
38 Described by Schmitt as “a remarkable final document of the continuing belief
in civilization, progress, and free trade, and of the fundamental European claim
based thereon to the free, i. e., non-state soil of the African continent open for
European land-appropriation”. Schmitt (n. 32) 216.
39 Article V.
40 Article IV (“Merchandise imported into those regions shall remain free from
entrance and transit dues.”).
41 Article III.
42 Article VI (“All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the
aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the
native tribes, and to care for the improvement of their moral and material
wellbeing, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the Slave Trade.
They shall, without distinction of creed or nation protect and favour all
religious, scientific, or charitable institutions and undertakings created and
organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the natives and
bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.”).
employ all means at their disposal to put an end to the trade in slaves.43
Thirdly, the powers bound themselves to respect the neutrality of the Congo
basin and committed themselves to lend their good offices to enable such
territory, in case of war, to be considered as belonging to a non-belligerent
state.44 Finally, and most significantly, the General Act committed any power
acquiring coastal territory on the African continent to notify all others of their
claim (article 34),45 and take such steps as necessary to ensure within those
territories the protection of vested rights and, where applicable, free trade
(article 35).46
For all the apparent significance of the General Act in terms of the way in
which it purported to set out the conditions for the subsequent partition of
Africa, it was also clearly limited in various ways. Crowe, in her later account
of the Conference, was in fact summarily dismissive:
“The importance of the conference as a landmark in international law, has in
fact been exaggerated, for when its regulations are studied it can be seen that
they all failed of their purpose. Free trade was to be established in the basin and
mouths of the Congo; there was to be free navigation of the Congo and the
Niger. Actually highly monopolistic systems of trade were set up in both those
regions. The centre of Africa was to be internationalised. It became Belgian.
Lofty ideals and philanthropic intentions were loudly enunciated by delegates
of every country … [and yet] the basin of the Congo … became subsequently,
as everyone knows, the scene of some of the worst brutalities in colonial
history … It was originally stipulated that the conventional Basin of the Congo
… should be neutralised in time of war. Actually it was found necessary to
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43 Article IX (“Seeing that trading in slaves is forbidden in conformity with the
principles of international law as recognized by the Signatory Powers, and
seeing also that the operations which, by sea or land, furnish slaves to trade,
ought likewise to be regarded as forbidden, the Powers which do or shall
exercise sovereign rights or influence in the territories forming the Conventio-
nal basin on the Congo, declare that these territories may not serve as a market
or means of transit for the Trade in Slaves, of whatever race they may be. Each
of the Powers binds itself to employ all the means at its disposal or putting an
end to this trade and for punishing those who engage in it.”).
44 Article
45 Article XXXIV (“Any Powers which henceforth takes possession of a trace of
land on the coasts of the African continent outside of its present possessions, as
well as the Power which assumes a Protectorate there, shall accompany the
respective act with a notification thereof, addressed to the other Signatory
Powers of the present Act, in order to enable them, if need be, to make good
any claims of their own.”).
46 Article XXXV (“The Signatory Powers of the present Act recognize the
obligation to ensure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied
by them on the coasts of the African Continent sufficient to protect existing
rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and transit under the
conditions agreed upon.”).
make neutrality optional. Only the Congo Free State opted for neutrality, and
this neutrality was violated by Germany in 1914. Last but not least, and this is
the feature of international law most commonly associated with it, the
conference made an attempt to regulate future acquisitions of colonial territory
on a legal basis. But here again, its resolutions, when closely scrutinised, are
found to be as empty as Pandora’s box. In the first place the rules laid down
concerning effective occupation, applied only to the coasts of West Africa,
which had already nearly all been seized, and which were finally partitioned
during the next few years; secondly, even within this limited sphere the
guarantees given by the powers amounted to little more than a simple promise
to notify the acquisition of any given piece of territory, after it had been
acquired, surely on every ground a most inadequate piece of legislation.”47
Whether or not Crowe may be thought to overstate, in one direction, what
might feasibly be expected of a multilateral agreement and understate, in
another, what its legal influence might really have been, it was certainly the
case that the formalities of the General Act were not to have a lasting impact.
A few formal notifications were made under the terms of article 34 in the
following years, but since it only extended to title to the coastal regions of
Africa such practice largely petered out in later years. Already by 1890 the
terms of the General Act, so far as relating to the question of slavery48 and the
importation of arms and liquor were largely superseded by those in the
Brussels General Act,49 a declaration appended to which also amended the
terms of article 4 by permitting the imposition of duties on imports.50 The
terms of the General Act were, for a period, to be routinely invoked in
disputes with the Congo Free State over matters of commercial freedom and
the treatment of natives, and also by Britain during the period in which she
pondered the recognition of the Congolese annexation by Belgium.51 But in
1919, ratification of the treaty of St Germain the terms of which purported to
supersede the Berlin General Act in its entirety – a conclusion which was,
albeit somewhat controversially, endorsed by the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in the Oscar Chinn case.52
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47 Crowe (n. 13) 3–4.
48 See, in particular, article IX.
49 Brussels General Act,
50 Declaration respecting Import Duties, 2nd July 1890, Hertslet (n. 33) II, 517.
Under the same authorisation, a separate scheme was established in relation to
the Eastern Zone of the Conventional Basin of the Congo by agreement
between Britain, Germany and Italy, Hertslet (n. 33), II, No. 131, 518. This
was to survive until 1901.
51 See generally, Cookey (n. 13). Further, E. Nys, Le droit international. Les
principes, les théories, les faits (1912).
52 See, M. Sorensen, The Modification of Collective Treaties without the
Consent of all the Contracting Parties, in: Nord TIR 9 (1938) 150.
From that stage onwards, it remained a point of reference in Arbitral
decisions in the 1920s and 1930s such as in the Island of Palmas53 and
Clipperton Island54 cases, but here mainly for purposes of being distinguis-
hed: there was no general obligation to notify; the Berlin General Act only
applied to Africa. It also, for a brief period of time, remained a resource in the
hands of certain German international lawyers, seeking to challenge the terms
of the Treaty of Versailles which, they maintained, had wrongfully deprived
Germany of its colonies.55 Nevertheless, by the time Jennings was to write his
influential monograph on the Acquisition of territory in international law in
1963, its significance had declined to the point at which he felt it necessary
only to mention the Berlin General Act in one footnote (n. 2, p. 39) where
Lauterpacht is quoted with approval denying its contemporary relevance.
If this is to testify as to the legal insignificance of the General Act, this was
not, as I have already suggested, the immediate impression of it for inter-
national lawyers at the time. Several key figures, such as Sir Travers Twiss and
Emile de Laveleye, had already involved themselves quite extensively in events
prior to, and during, the Conference. And subsequent to the Conference itself,
a slew of books and articles on the subject of the acquisition of territorial
sovereignty, the nature of colonial protectorates, the desirability of inter-
national navigation regimes or the neutralisation of territory, were produ-
ced.56 The Institut de Droit International, furthermore, was encouraged to
attempt to formulate a set of principles that gave expression to the newly
emergent consensus that had apparently emerged.57 It was the cause, in brief,
of a significant amount of doctrinal reflection some of which concerned, as we
shall see, meditations on the general character of international law.
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53 See, Island of Palmas case (Netherlands, USA), RIAA (1928) II 829, 868.
54 Arbitral Award on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the Sovereignty
over Clipperton Island, Jan. 28, 1931, in: AJIL 26 (1932) 390, 394.
55 See???,
56 See e. g., E. Engelhardt, Conférence de Berlin – Origin des Actes de
Navigation du Congo et du Niger, in: RDILC (1886) 96; Engelhardt, Etude
sur la Déclaration de la Conférence de Berlin Relative aux Occupations, in:
RDILC (1886) 433; F. de Martens, La Conférence du Congo à Berlin et la
politique coloniale des Etats modernes, in: RDILC (1886) 113, 244; J. Hor-
nung, Civilisés et barbares, in: RDILC (1886) 188, 281; J. Jooris, De
l’occupation des territories sans maître sure la côte d’Afrique. La Question
d’Angra Pequena, in: RDILC (1886) 236
57 On the work of the Institut in this respect see M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle
Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960
(2002) 98–178.
Chapters and Principles – John Westlake’s Berlin
John Westlake’s Chapters on the Principles of International Law,58 published
some nine years after the Conference is perhaps one of the best examples of
this initial species of doctrinal reflection. He was clearly not alone in under-
standing the Conference and General Act to have had some impact upon, or
relevance for, general international law:59
Most international lawyers writing upon that subject between 1885 and
1914 would routinely refer to the Berlin General Act as part of a general
discourse on territorial sovereignty.60 Nor, as we shall see, can his Chapters be
regarded as a definitive statement of the condition of international law at the
time: in many respects he sought to position himself outside, or between, what
he saw to be the dominant traditions of thought at the time (the analytical
school on one side, the historical school on the other). What is of particular
interest in his work, however, is the way he attempts to weave together two
divergent strands of thought that were in common circulation – one being a
consciousness as to the historically-contingent character of European inter-
national law; the other a sense as to the universal orientation of the precepts
that underpinned that thought and practice (in which the terms “civilisation”,
“progress”, and “humanity” were often at the fore). As Westlake was aware,
these stood in tension with one another and the occasion of the Berlin
Conference – in which the question as to how one might conceptualise legal
relations with the non-European world came to the fore – provided the
opportunity for bringing them together in some way.
At the outset, there is no doubt that the Berlin Conference was one, if not
the main, cause for Westlake writing and publishing his Chapters, and the
terms of the General Act lie as a background thread throughout. His key
concern, as he points out in his preface, was a problem that had been
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58 J. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (1894).
59 Westlake (n. 58) 105. (“The rules which the African Conference of Berlin laid
down in Articles 34 and 35 of its General Act, though limited in their
expression to the acquisition of territory on the coast of Africa, embody the
shape which the law as to the original acquisition of title has taken under the
influence of these views. Few doubt that their principles are applicable
generally …”).
60 P. Fiore, Nouveau droit international public suivant les besoins de la civilisa-
tion moderne (2e éd., trad. par Charles Antoine, 1885); G. Jéze, Etude
theoretique et practique sur l’occupation comme mode d’acquérir les territoires
en droit international (1896); A. Rivier, Programme d’un cours de droit des
gens (1889); Nys (n. 51) II; C. Salomon, De l’occupation des territoires sans
maître (1889).
discussed, but only unsatisfactorily resolved in Berlin: what were the general
principles concerning the acquisition of sovereignty over “new” territory?
What role was played, in that respect, by the various treaties (principally
treaties of Protection) concluded with native authorities? What was one to
make of the modes of historic title such as “discovery”? What events at the
Conference clearly demonstrated, to Westlake, was the need for some
conceptual elaboration of the notion of territorial sovereignty, and he saw
himself as having a particular contribution to make in that regard. He was to
note, in any case, that “the great human interest of that question [vis, the
Berlin Conference] would of itself have been sufficient motive for its introduc-
tion into this book, even had it not been required for the scientific purpose
mentioned.”61
The key problem that Westlake sought to address was what he saw to be
the persistence within contemporary legal scholarship of a neo-feudal confla-
tion of idea of territorial sovereignty with that of property.62 Since, in feudal
society, kingdoms and principalities were understood largely as the property
of kings or princes, capable of being passed by marriage, bequest or
inheritance,63 it was unsurprising that the Roman Law notions of imperium
and dominium had lacked any effective distinction. In a post-Feudal world,
however, these terms were to be differentiated. Imperium, as Westlake was to
aver, was the Roman law term for sovereignty and expressed “primarily an
authority over persons, but extended to the relation which a state bears to its
territory”,64 whereas dominium was the term for property, whether that be
the property of a private person or of the State itself. The distinction was
important insofar as property and sovereignty played “different parts in the
system of acts and purposes which makes up civilised life”. In case of the
cession of territory, for example, the State receiving the territory would receive
sovereignty over the whole, but only those proprietary entitlements to such
public property as existed within that territory prior to the act of cession.65
Westlake’s point, however, was not merely to rectify the misapplication of
Roman speculations about natural modes of acquiring property, but to
address a more concrete problem that he saw arising as a consequence of
the discussion in Berlin over title to territory in Africa. The key to under-
standing that problem, however, lies first of all in his account of international
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61 Westlake (n. 58) xiv.
62 Westlake (n. 58) 131–132.
63 Westlake (n. 58) 131 (“it belonged to the king to govern his kingdom as it
belonged to the lord to govern his manor”).
64 Westlake (n. 58) 133.
65 Westlake (n. 58) 129–130.
law, the main features of which may be gleaned from the first three of his
eighteen Principles:66
“1. The society of states, having European civilisation, or the international
society, is the most comprehensive form of society among men, but it is among
men that it exists. States are its immediate, men its ultimate members. The
duties and rights of states are only the duties and rights of the men who
compose them.
2. The consent of the international society to the rules prevailing in it is the
consent of the men who are the ultimate members of that society. When one of
those rules is invoked against a state, it is not necessary to show that the state
in question has assented to the rule either diplomatically or by having acted on
it though it is a strong argument if you can do so. It is enough to show that the
general consensus of opinion within the limits of European civilisation is in
favour of the rule.
3. The consent of international society, defined as in the last paragraph, and
given to a rule as an enforceable rule of law, is normally binding on the
consciences of men in matters arising within the society and transcending the
state tie, as state law is normally binding on the conscience within that tie. Such
consent therefore normally determines the mutual duties and rights of the
states in which men are grouped. This is so because the international society is
not a voluntary but a necessary one, and the general consensus of opinion
among its members is the only authority that can make rules for it. The men
who compose any state derive benefits from that society, and therefore cannot
at their pleasure adhere to it in part and not altogether … The social nature of
man lies at the bottom of these reasons.”
For Westlake, thus, international law represented a system of rules that had
emerged by “general consensus” within a particular society (civilised Euro-
pean society), the addressees of which were those “men” (sic!) who comprised
that society, and who were bound to it by reason of both conscience and
necessity. As we shall see below, Westlake’s views in this respect were
undoubtedly shaped by the tradition of the German historical school whose
emphasis on the grounding of law in culture, language and tradition (as
represented in the idea of the Volksgeist) had laid down a challenge to the
rationalist universalism of Enlightenment thought and its associated advocacy
of “natural rights”.67 The dictates of reason, as Westlake was to note, were
always historically contingent, dependent upon both time and place,68 and
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66 Westlake (n. 58) 78–85.
67 Westlake distinguishes, here, between the original jus naturale, understood as
“a body of rules at one time believed to be ascertainable and primary” and its
later corruption in which it came to be understood as “a body of rights
believed to exist by nature, and to secure which is supposed to be the primary
function of law”. Westlake (n. 58) 113.
68 J. Westlake, Introductory Lecture on International Law, 17th October 1888,
in: J. Westlake, Collected Papers on International Law (L. Oppenheim ed.
the language of natural rights was therefore ultimately unhelpful since it not
only obscured the articulation of decisive rules,69 but also wrongly conflated
the ethical with the juridical.70 “Ideals are always propagandist” as he was to
later note.71
Westlake’s emphasis upon the centrality of social consensus, here, was
underpinned by an essentially sociological conviction that Europe enjoyed a
common civilisation:
“Throughout Europe and America, if we except Turkey, habits occupations
and ideas are very similar. Family life, and social life in the narrower sense of
that term, are based on monogamous marriage and respect for women. The
same arts and sciences are taught and pursued, the same avocations and
interests are protected by similar laws, civil and criminal, the administration of
which is directed by a similar sense of justice. The same dangers are seen to
threaten the fabric of society, similar measures are taken or discussed with the
object of eluding them, and the same hopes are entertained that improvement
will continue to be realised. The literature which is occupied with the life and
destiny of man, which entertains him and expresses his most intimate feelings,
is read everywhere from whatever country it emanates. There are differences in
detail, but no one who has a liberal education feels himself a stranger in the
houses, schools, law courts, theatres, scarcely even in the churches, of another
country. Not only is there a great circulation of people regardless of territorial
boundaries, but the native subjects of one state travelling or resident in another
do not form a class apart; they mix freely with the population, and usually feel
themselves safe under the administration of justice.”72
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1914) 403–404 (in which he expresses profound scepticism as to the existence
of general “principles of international legislation”).
69 Westlake (n. 58) 112 (“[S]ince the cases in which the right of self-preservation
is alleged are precisely those in which it would clash with the right of
independence, which is equally asserted by the advocates of natural rights, it
follows that no rules, but confusion, must result from recognition either right
as absolute”).
70 Westlake (n. 58) 113. In the main, Westlake was to regard the key to this
distinction as being found in the idea of enforceability: “When a claim is urged
but is not held to be enforceable, it is commonly called a moral claim as
distinguished from a legal one. In order to become a legal claim it must be
accompanied by the sentiment that it would be justifiable to enforce it, and that
sentiment must be shared by the general mass of some society which is
concerned with the matter.” (Westlake [n. 58] 2–3). See also, Westlake,
Introductory Lecture (n. 68) 402–403 where he stresses the important role of
“human authority more or less regular its action” in determining the necessity
for enforcement, and indicates that the principles marking the boundary
between “the morally right and the enforceable, must bear the same relation
to the rules of International Law which what Bentham called the principles of
legislation bear to national law”.
71 J. Westlake, The Transvaal War (1899), in:Collected Papers (n. 68), 419, 424.
72 Westlake (n. 58) 101–102.
Of course, if international law was to be identified with the social and cultural
parameters of European society, and was dependent ultimately upon a
collective psychological self-consciousness, then relations with the non-Euro-
pean world were immediately rendered problematic. How might one insist
upon the adhesion of non-European societies to the rules of international law
if, culturally speaking, they shared little in common? How, furthermore,
might one view those treaties of cession or protection that had been concluded
with native sovereigns in Africa and elsewhere for purposes of establishing
title to such territory? For Westlake, it was the second, rather than the first of
these questions that required answering. As regards the first, the issue was
really just the extent to which European states might wish to admit non-
European states (such as Turkey, Persia, China, Japan and Siam) to the
benefits of membership in the system – and then the choice remained as to
whether they would be admitted to merely “parts of international law” rather
than the whole of it.73 In practice, of course, he concluded that as a
consequence of the necessity of imposing regimes of consular jurisdiction,
the partial option had often been preferred – even, paradoxically, in case of
Turkey despite the fact that she had been admitted into European society as a
consequence of the Treaty of Paris of 1856.
It was in relation to the second question – concerning the status of treaties
of protection or cession – that his distinction between sovereignty and
property again became important. Westlake was to observe, at the outset,
that the character of territorial sovereignty as it was known in international
law was impossible to deduce from examination of the situation in “old
countries” – all one would be faced by, in any particular case, would be a
local distribution of territory and property:
“All [such] states … hold their territory by the same kind of title by which their
subjects hold their property in land, that is by a series of human dealings – as
cession or conquest in the one case, conveyance inter vivos or will in the other –
deduced from a root assumed as presenting an irreducible situation of fact.”74
In such a context, the idea of sovereignty (as imperium rather than dominium)
remained hidden behind the veil of ownership. One might attempt move back
down the chain of ownership, he suggests, to search out the moment of
original acquisition (as might be identified in a postulated “state of nature”),
but such philosophical or “prehistorical” speculation was really of no
relevance. Not only would it be entirely speculative75 but it faced a logical
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impasse: the moment in which sovereignty might be said to have been first
formed, was not a moment in which one might describe its character, for it
was that which had yet to be produced.76 The meaning of territorial sover-
eignty, in short, was something that could only be observed in the contrast
between the European world, where it existed as a matter of fact, and the non-
European world, in which it had yet to be established.
It was, thus, in the context of the extension of territorial sovereignty over
new areas that the character of territorial sovereignty really came to the fore.
At the start of his short four-page excursus on the topic, Westlake begins with
the following:
“No theorist on law who is pleased to imagine a state of nature independent of
human institutions can introduce into his picture a difference between civilised
and uncivilised man, because it is just in the presence or absence of certain
institutions, or in their greater or less perfection, that that difference consists
for the lawyer.”77
At first glance Westlake might be mistaken for expressing the intuition that
the establishment of ideas of governmentality that necessitate a differentiation
between “civilised and uncivilised man” are inconsistent with general princip-
les of natural right. Yet of course he was saying precisely the opposite. What
he meant was that the speculative idea of the social contract and of natural
right that had underpinned the political discourse of the enlightenment was
fundamentally problematic precisely as a consequence of their inability to
recognize the concrete realities of a world divided by reference to its degree of
civilisation.78 Apart from signalling his distaste for the doctrines of natural
right, and his determination to distance himself from the tradition of Wolff
and Vattel,79 Westlake calls attention here to the central role played by the
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76 Westlake (n. 58) 134–135, 136 (“[W]hatever light philology or archaeology
may throw on the early history of mankind, an impassable barrier separates
their researches, in spite of the great interest that must be felt in them, from the
subjects with which international law has to do.”). Jameson adverts to a
similar problem that occupies the work of Rousseau, for whom, it is argued,
the origin of the society, as for language, is founded in nothing other than the
fundamental contradiction of effect preceding cause. F. Jameson, Valences of
the Dialectic (2009) 308–314.
77 Westlake (n. 58) 137.
78 Cf. Gong ???.
79 See C. Wolff, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, in quo jus
gentium naturale ab eo, quod voluntarii, pactitii et consuetudinarii est,
accurate distinguitur (1749); E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou Principes
de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des
souverains (1758). For Westlake’s account of the two see Westlake (n. 58)
70–77.
idea of civilisation in international law. Civilisation, in this context,80 was
civilisation of an institutional kind rather than that of an individual moral,
aesthetic or cultural activity, the key to which was the presence or absence of
institutions of law and governance capable of regulating everyday life, and
sufficiently well established to ensure that it was “not disturbed by contests
between different European powers for supremacy on the same soil”.81 As an
idea, its significance lay in the fact that European states had different relations
with non-European peoples depending upon the presence or absence of such
institutions: “[w]herever a population furnishes such a government as this,
the law of our international society has to take account of it”.82 Where, by
contrast, no such government is evident, “the first necessity is that a go-
vernment should be furnished” and that it would be the responsibility of
European powers to do so. This, furthermore, was an unavoidable necessity
given the overt social compulsions which he saw to prevail: “[t]he inflow of
the white race cannot be stopped where there is land to cultivate, ore to be
mined, commerce to be developed, sport to enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied”.83
Even if, he was to add, a “fanatical admirer of savage life” were to demand
that the whites be kept out, government would still be necessary in order to
effectuate that result. One way or another, colonial rule seemed inevitable.
Although it provided a vital clue to his position, this still left open the
conditions under which European States might establish their sovereignty
over such “uncivilised” regions. And it was at this point, that Westlake turned
to events at the Berlin Conference. At the time at which the delegates were
agreeing the final text of articles 34 and 35 of the General Act – which, as we
have seen, provided that any power acquiring coastal territory on the African
continent had to notify all others of their claim (article 34), and take such
steps as necessary to ensure within those territories the protection of vested
rights and, where applicable, free trade (article 35) – the American delegate
Kasson, introduced the apparently radical idea that since “Modern inter-
national law” was leading to the recognition “of the right of native tribes to
dispose freely of themselves and of their hereditary territory”, the principle
should be “extended” to require the “voluntary consent of the natives whose
country is taken possession of, in all cases where they had not provoked the
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constituted European civilisation noted above (supra, text accompanying n.
???). For a similar distinction see J. Mill, Dissertations and Discussions:
Political, Philosophical and Historical (1859) I, 160–205.
81 Westlake (n. 58) 141–143.
82 Westlake (n. 58) 142.
83 Westlake (n. 58) 142–143.
aggression”.84 Although reported in the Protocol annexed to the General Act,
this was not a point subject to elaborate discussion albeit the case that it
seemed to indicate the position that would be adopted by the US when it came
to deciding whether or not to recognize the claims made under article 34.
In some respects, Kasson’s intervention seemed to come out of thin air – in
what respect had modern international law led to the recognition of the right
of native tribes to dispose freely of themselves? What evidence was there for
this nascent notion of “self-determination”? What, furthermore, did Kasson
really intend by his intervention? There seemed to be at least two plausible
sources for this reflection. The first was the emergent practice within Europe
that, as had been noted by those such as Woolsey, had led states to seek the
consent of inhabitants of ceded territory.85 Thus in 1860 the Neapolitan
provinces of Sicily, the Marches and Umbria were annexed to the kingdom of
Italy through direct and universal suffrage, and the Treaty of Turin uniting
Savoy and Nice to France enjoined the parties concerned to determine the will
of the inhabitants. The principle of popular consent prior to changes in
sovereignty could presumably be also extended to territorial acquisition in the
non-European world. The second, and more immediate, ground for Kasson’s
interjection, however, related to the agreements that had been concluded with
native sovereigns in Africa through which the latter either explicitly “ceded”
their sovereignty to the European power concerned, or extended certain
concessions of exclusivity. Of particular significance, here, was the ongoing
debate at Berlin over the recognition of Leopold’s International Association of
the Congo. By the beginning of 1884, the International Association had
already established a number of centres of trade and commerce in the Congo
and had concluded a range of treaties with local sovereigns in favour of what
it referred to as “Free States”.86 As the Association was to put it:
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84 Protocol of 31st January 1885. Parliamentary Paper, c. 4361, 209; Gavin and
Betley (n. 13) 240. Kasson added that this should constitute “the minimum of
the conditions which must necessarily be fulfilled in order that the recognition
of an occupation may be demanded”, and that “it should be well understood
that it is reserved for the respective signatory powers to determine all the other
conditions from the point of view of right as well as of fact which must be
fulfilled before an occupation can be recognised as valid.”
85 T. Woolsey, International Law (5th ed., 1878) 65–66.
86 Stanley was to later make clear that he had concluded over 450 treaties with
native sovereigns. See H. Stanley, The Congo and the Founding of its Free
State: A Story of Work and Exploration (1885) II, 379. (“The Association were
in possession of treaties made with over 450 independent African chiefs, whose
rights would be conceded by all to have been indisputable, since they held their
lands by undisturbed occupation, by long ages of succession, by real divine
right. Of their own free will, without coercion, but for substantial considera-
“by treaties with the legitimate Sovereigns in the basins of the Congo and the
Niadi Kwilu and in adjacent territories upon the Atlantic there has been ceded
to it territory for the use and benefit of Free States established and being
established under the care and supervision of the said Association in the said
basins and adjacent territories to which cession of the said Free States of right
succeed.”87
The real problem for the Association, of course, was that it looked very much
more like a private enterprise with a few trading stations than a state as such,
and the earlier recognition of its “flag” by the US88 had not entirely
persuaded other, more sceptical, powers.89 Kasson’s intervention, in that
context, seemed designed to cut through the remaining doubts by privileging
the centrality of native consent and thus providing an effective basis for the
recognition of the authority of the International Association.90
Whether or not as a conscious attempt to reflect the British government’s
evident anxiety over the status accorded to the International Association,
Westlake’s response to Kasson’s intervention was to regard it as fundamen-
tally misconceived. As much as a state might legitimately concern itself with
abuse meted out by another power to an uncivilised population, it would
simply be going too far to suggest that their free consent was a necessary
prerequisite for the establishment over them of a government possessing
international validity. It might, as had been recognized at the Conference, be
“a good ground of objection on the part of any power that pleased to take up
the cause”,91 but to make it a condition precedent for the acquisition of
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sovereignty and of ownership to the Association.”)
87 In a letter of 12th December 1883 to Sanford (who was coordinating the lobby
for US recognition of the Association), Jules Devaux, writing on behalf of King
Leopold, described the situation as follows:
“The stations and territories have a local government, their chiefs are chiefs of
districts. They have made an agreement with the native kings to form a Union
on certain conditions which have been settled … What we ask for is not the
recognition of the governments of the stations and territories but that in
consequence of an exchange of declarations their flag should be treated as
‘pavillon ami’. What exists on the Congo i. e. the settlements, the forces, the
administrations, the agreements with the native chiefs is quite sufficient to
authorize and justify the recognition.”
State Papers, 25, 191; Bontinck (n. 27) 181–182.
88 State Papers, 1883–1884, lxxv, 377; Westlake (n. 58) 201.
89 Granville to Malet, 24th November 1884, FO 403/47, No. 147 (No. 98 Africa).
90 For the view that Kasson was largely acting as an advocate for the Association
see Thomson (n. 13) 221–223.
91 Westlake (n. 58) 139. See comments of Busch, Protocol 8, Jan 31st 1885
(Gavin and Betley [n. 13] 239, 240).
sovereignty per se, would have been to defeat the object of the Conference
which was to prevent collisions between its members and regulate their
position on the African coast. Who, after all, was to say whether the tribe
had consented? Would they even understand what it meant to cede territory?
And if they did, what formalities would need to be observed? Much better,
Westlake observed, that such people be deemed to fall under the benign
authority of a European State. Becoming the subjects of the power possessing
international title to the country in which they live “natives have on their
governors more than the common claim of the governed, they have the claim
of the ignorant and helpless on the enlightened and strong; and that claim is
the more likely to receive justice, the freer is the position of the governors
from insecurity and vexation”.92
Westlake’s absolute denial of legal agency to the “natives” was to inform
his stance on a series of cognate issues. Treaties with “uncivilised tribes” could
not, on their own, be treated as adequate to establish title over territory. Since
natives “in rudimentary condition” take no rights under international law, no
cession of sovereignty was possible. “A stream” as he was to put it “cannot
rise higher than its source”.93 Such agreements might, at best, provide
evidence of fact that the natives in question have been treated with “humanity
and consideration”, or provide a basis for the respect of “moral title to such
property or power as they understand”.94 Similarly, treaties of protection in
uncivilised regions were unlike those in Europe95 and formed, ultimately,
merely a kind of inchoate title (rather like discovery) that was preliminary to
plenary title established through effective occupation.96
If by stressing the centrality of effective occupation, Westlake might have
been expressing an opinion widely-shared, his views on treaties of protection
were altogether more controversial. At the Conference itself, a heated debate
had broken out over the extent to which the obligations contained in article
35 of the General Act, should apply “colonial protectorates”.97 The original
text proposed for article 35 by the German government had provided that the
Powers concerned acknowledge the obligation to “establish and to maintain
in the territories or places occupied or taken under their protection a
jurisdiction sufficient to secure the maintenance of peace, respect for rights
acquired, and, where necessary, respect for the conditions under which liberty
24 The Invention of a Tradition
92 Westlake (n. 58) 140.
93 Westlake (n. 58) 144.
94 Westlake (n. 58) 145.
95 The examples from Europe included the Ionian Islands and San Marino.
96 Westlake (n. 58) 177–187.
97 Westlake (n. 58) 178–179.
of commerce and of transit shall have been guaranteed”.98 The British
delegates, however, conscious that this might have profound implications
for their administration of overseas territory in which much looser arrange-
ments were in place, maintained that a clear distinction had to be drawn
between annexations and protectorates.99 Whereas annexation implied “the
direct assumption of territorial sovereignty”, protectorates, by contrast,
maintained “recognition of the right of the aborigines, or other actual
inhabitants, to their own country, with no further assumption of territorial
rights than is necessary to maintain the paramount authority and discharge
the duties of the protecting Power”.100
To a large extent, this was a peculiarly British problem in the sense that it
proceeded from a concern that the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843 did not, in
fact, provide a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over foreigners in
protected territory.101 Whilst Westlake ultimately disagreed with the latter
contention, he was at one with the position of the British government in
relation to the question of colonial protectorates. These were marked, in his
view, by three particular characteristics: first the rights enjoyed in protectora-
tes fell short of those associated with the enjoyment of territorial sovereignty;
secondly, they were exclusionary in the sense that they limited the ability of
other states from exercising authority within that territory; and finally they
enjoyed the character of a “guardianship” in the sense that the protecting
state “represents and protects the district and its population, native or
civilised, in everything which relates to other powers”.102 Whilst it is possible
to discern very clearly, here, the origins of the idea of tutelage that eventually
underpinned the Mandate system in the League of Nations, what is more
remarkable is the inventive flexibility of Westlake’s analysis – guardianship
being adduced as a novel intermediate category (in which the question of
sovereignty remains entirely indeterminate) the overt purpose of which being
to explain and justify the apparent variability of British practice.
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Doctrinal Dissensus
As his position in respect of Protectorates suggests, whilst Westlake’s general
discussion of such issues may be regarded as broadly typical of that
encountered in late 19th Century literature on international law, it is by no
means expressive of a uniformity of view. On this matter, he was clearly
advocating a position preferred by the British government. In many other
matters, however, he worked in a field of his own – positioned, as he saw it,
some way between the idealism of the continent and the analytical formalism
of the Anglo-American tradition.103 He shared with Twiss and Hall, a
peculiarly British approach to inchoate title, but yet distanced himself from
Twiss’s “continental” fixation with the “natural rights” of sovereignty,104 and
from Hall’s analytical conception of statehood.105 His account did not begin
and end with a definition of sovereignty (which, indeed, played very small
part in his account)106, nor was the State and its “abstract rights” the starting
point of his analysis.107 In similar vein, Westlake’s denial of native sover-
eignty was not a uniform position adopted by international lawyers at the
time – many were willing to accept that “uncivilised” communities in Africa
and elsewhere enjoyed rights of sovereignty.108
The range of views in play were, in fact, made all too evident in the
subsequent discussions within the Institut de Droit International which, in
1885, commissioned a report from Martitz to enable them to consider the
outcome of the Berlin Conference. Martitz’s “Projet de déclaration” summa-
rised, in its first article, what he saw to be the overall sense of the General Act:
all territory not under the sovereignty or protection of States forming part of
the international legal community, and whether or not inhabited, constituted
26 The Invention of a Tradition
103 Westlake, ???.
104 See T. Twiss, The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Communities
(2nd ed. 1884).
105 See W. Hall, A Treatise on International Law (4th ed. 1895).
106 His discussion of “sovereignty” largely accords it a descriptive role. See e. g. his
famous formula on p. 87 (“Independence like every negative, does not admit of
degrees … Sovereignty is partible. A group of men is fully sovereign when it has
no constitutional relations making it in any degree dependent on any other
group: if it has such relations, so much of sovereignty as they leave it is kind or
degree of semi-sovereignty, though the constitution may not call it by that
name.”).
107 Westlake, Introductory Lecture (n. 68) 412. Westlake’s later two-volume
treatise entitled International Law, was to assume a very much more traditional
format, but even here he was to resist the temptation to proceed from a
discussion of states to a description of their “rights”.
108 See e. g., Salomon (n. 60); Hornung (n. 56).
“territorium nullius”.109 The point was not that the territory was to be
treated as unoccupied (i. e. as res nullius), but simply as a non-sovereign
domain whose possession by European powers was ultimately to be treated as
original not derivative. Although one might have surmised, in light of articles
34 and 35 of the General Act, that such a proposition was largely uncontro-
versial, the article was unanimously rejected albeit on a number of different
grounds. Some, like Engelhardt, regarded the opposition between sovereignty
and terra nullius as far too categoric: not all territory outside the family of
nations could be regarded as unoccupied in that sense. If anything, the basic
rule of practice seemed to be that occupation, as Kasson had intimated, was to
be based upon consent.110 Others, like Hornung, were more explicit in their
anti-colonial sentiments – rejecting the notion of terra nullius, albeit in terms
that still spoke of the possibility for the appropriate “tutelage” of the
uncivilised natives. That the Institut was ultimately unable to agree upon
any particular formulation was not merely to highlight the lack of consensus
on such basic issues amongst international lawyers at that time, but also the
apparent level of indeterminacy that appeared to lie behind the concrete terms
of the General Act itself.
One of the most curious features of this discussion at the Institut, is that it
was conducted in a language that was almost entirely absent from the
Conference itself. Although at various stages in proceedings, participants
had referred, in passing, to “unoccupied territory”,111 or the “prise de
possession” of territory, for the most part, no mention was made of the
phrase “terra nullius” nor was there any real speculation on the subject of
native sovereignty.112 The real question for the delegates was how coloniza-
tion might take place and how one might demonstrate adequate proof of
possession – whether through occupation pure and simple, or by some other
means113 – rather than whether there existed a “right to colonize” or
appropriate territory merely by occupation, or whether certain communities
on the continent could be regarded as “sovereign”. It was certainly evident
that absent a supposition that Africa was indeed territorium nullius, as
Martitz was to put it, not much sense could be made of articles 34 and
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35,114 but that is merely to bring to the fore the role played by Westlake and
others subsequent to the Conference in rationalising the outcome by giving
expression to what they saw to be the unarticulated premises that appeared to
be embedded within it.115 That model of engagement was, ultimately, to
highlight the superficiality of the doctrinal disputes: what was not in question
was the fact that Africa was being partitioned and that the task for all was one
of attempting to square off, in one way or another, that irreducible reality
with what was otherwise known about international law. That for Salomon it
might have represented a hesitant step towards the recognition of native
sovereignty, or for Westlake an affirmation as to its irrelevance, was perhaps
of little consequence.
Whilst they might have differed considerably in terms of the methodolo-
gical or analytical techniques employed, therefore, it is nevertheless plausible
to suggest that much of the work of international lawyers at this time was
broadly homologous. What they seemed to share, above all else, was a basic
consciousness as to the existence of a distinction between the European and
non-European worlds that was such as to allow the latter to become the
object of colonial expansion. As Koskenniemi summarises:
“The colonial discourse of late nineteenth-century international law was able
to accommodate positions as apparently wide apart as Westlake’s and
Hornung’s to create a solid defence of the extension of European influence.
It was a discourse of exclusion-inclusion; exclusion in terms of a cultural
argument about the otherness of the non-European that made it impossible to
extend European rights to the native, inclusion in terms of the native’s
similarity with the European, the native’s otherness having been erased by a
universal humanitarianism under which international lawyers sought to
replace native institutions by European sovereignty.”116
The key, in that sense, was not to be found in the existence or otherwise of
agreement over the concept of terra nullius, or indeed over the necessity for
native consent, but rather in the adoption of a generic standpoint which both
relied upon, and produced, a particular knowledge of the non-European
world, placing it as an terrain of action, in a penumbral zone on the outer
edges of the family of nations. Even if, thus, the language was occasionally
that one? of humanity, self-government, or emancipation, it nevertheless
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seemed to function as a “servile ancilla regnorum”117 obedient to the over-
riding imperatives of global commercial expansion and colonial rule.
History and Society
The main perceived cause for this loss of critical faculty on the part of 19th
Century international legal scholars has largely been attributed to the emer-
gence of “positivist” thought – and Westlake himself is frequently taken to be
a clear exponent of that jurisprudential tradition.118 It is not entirely clear,
however, that Westlake fully merits such a description.119 He would certainly
speak of “positive law”, as did many others, but there is no obvious evidence
that he regarded use of this phrase as summarising his theoretical approach to
international law in any direct sense. If, furthermore, it is taken to mean a
theoretical tradition that emphasised the fundamental centrality of
“sovereignty”, or of the “state”, Westlake was certainly not an adherent.120
What is evident, nevertheless, is that Westlake’s attention was drawn to a
form of “scientific method” that broadly accorded with the general tenets of
Comtean positivism121 – namely a post-metaphysical commitment to expe-
riential, “scientific” knowledge, whose primary model was taken to be that of
the causal rules of the natural sciences.122 In Westlake’s case, this involved the
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which, whilst distinct from the abstract sciences of geometry or mathematics,
identification of a limited set of general principles that he purported to deduce
from the array of social practices and institutions that characterised the raw
material of international law.123 His “inductive” disposition,124 here, not
only necessitated an emphasis being placed upon what he saw to be
observable social facts (laws, institutions, modes of government)125 but also
to the maintenance of an unavoidable distinction between law and morality
(the former which lay in the register of fact, the latter in that of faith).
Nevertheless, Westlake’s position on all these points was an attenuated
one. What states did, or how they behaved, was certainly of considerable
importance, but any such practice necessarily had to be brought within some
kind of analytical frame the existence of which, in some ways, preceded the
practice itself: “some clue” as he was to put it, must be given “before that
labyrinth is entered”.126 His principles, thus, were necessarily partially
descriptive, partially evaluative: not everything could be made to “fit” the
scheme of analysis. He was very clear, for example, about the relative
permissibility of different kinds of treaties with native sovereigns (which
depended upon how plausible it was that the natives understood that to which
they purported to agree),127 he was also distinctly sceptical of certain kinds of
claims made by European powers in which they purported to establish their
title to territory by way of “discovery” or by means of the “hinterland
doctrine”.128 Work had to be done to make sense of the evidence, and what
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was never far in the background were claims to right and justice. Whilst law
and morality were analytically separate, they were nevertheless connected:
both were matters that engaged the conscience, both entailed claims in the
language of right or justice, both operated also at the level of public discourse.
The distinction between them, in fact, depended upon the extent of their
social purchase in the public mind: the content of this public consciousness
would be the ground for determining whether particular moral claims might
enjoy a right of enforcement and hence the status as “law”.129 Morality was,
ultimately, far from unimportant: not only did it serve as the necessary engine
of legal change but also became the temporal marker of social progress.
In the final analysis, Westlake’s conception of law was a social one:
conceived as a set of rules generated within a particular political community;
the product of collective human action and agency, shaped by language,
culture and tradition, not reified as an object whose existence stood outside
the social context in which it was generated, nor hypothesised as a conse-
quence of some rationalist reflection upon the character of human nature. It
was, in that sense both historical,130 and innately critical: one whose target
was the axioms or a priori metaphysics of the secular humanists whose
universals (sovereignty, natural rights) were undercut by the knowledge that
they were the historical product of a particular social, cultural, and political
milieu (for which the shorthand “European society” was summative).131 Even
if reason had a part to play in the development of rules of international law –
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in the sense of being descriptive of the process by which new rules or
principles come to be established in social thought and practice – it was only
through the medium of “experience” that they would enter the domain of
law.132
To the extent that he pitched himself against a form of a-historic idealism,
Westlake was working in a tradition that extended as far back as Montes-
quieu,133 whose emphasis upon the impact of culture, religion, climate and
soil upon the generation of particular legal forms had informed the subse-
quent emergence of the German Historical School134 and beyond that, the
work of many of Westlake’s contemporaries135 (including his immediate
predecessor in the Whewell chair at Cambridge, Sir Henry Maine).136 Both
Niebuhr137 and von Savigny had, through their studies of Roman law, come
to the conclusion that particular legal institutions – of property, marriage, and
so forth – were not only embedded in particular social contexts, as Montes-
quieu had noted,138 but were to organically evolve with changing conditions
of society. As Savigny was to put it:
“In the earliest times to which authentic history extends, the law will be found
to have already attained a fixed character, peculiar to the people, like their
language, manners and constitution. Nay, these phenomena have no separate
existence, they are but the particular faculties and tendencies of an individual
people, inseparably united in nature … That which binds them into one whole
is the common conviction of the people, the kindred consciousness of an
inward necessity, excluding all notion of an accidental and arbitrary
origin.”139
And, so far as concerns the evolution of this kindred consciousness:
“For law, as for language, there is no moment of absolute cessation; it is subject
to the same movement and development as every other popular tendency; and
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this very development remains under the same law of inward necessity, as in its
earliest stages. Law grows with the growth, and strengthens with the strength
of the people.”140
If, for Savigny, the direct consequence of this insight was to contest Thibaut’s
proposals for the legal codification of civil law within Germany,141 its broader
implications were clear enough. In the first place, it could always operate as
an adjunct to, or refinement of, the conjectural histories of the Scottish
Enlightenment:142 changes in the form of legal ownership mapping themsel-
ves sequentially through different modes, or “stages”, of economic and
political organization. Marx’s particular debt to Niebuhr and von Savigny
in this respect is evident.143 Secondly, and in a related sense, just as the
socially and culturally contingent character of law seemed to necessitate a
differentiation in both time and space, so also did it seem that the two forms
of differentiation might also be of essentially the same order. As Maine was to
explain it, the historical and the comparative methods were, in some respects,
co-terminous:
“We take a number of contemporary facts, ideas, and customs, and we infer
the past form of those facts, ideas, and customs not only from historical
records of that past form, but from examples of it which have not yet died out
of the world, and are still to be found within it. [W]hen … we have learned not
to exclude from our view of the earth and man those great and unexplored
regions which we vaguely term the East, we find it to be not wholly a conceit or
a paradox to say that the distinction between the Present and the Past
disappears. Sometimes the Past is the Present …”144
The recognition of a temporal disjunction between Europe’s present and its
past, in other words, could be founded upon a knowledge of the “non-
progressive”, “barbarous” or “primitive” conditions of extra-European
society whose evolution, furthermore, was conceptualised as being
“naturally” coincident with the historical trajectory of European society
(from “status” to “contract” as Maine was to put it).145
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This reliance upon an evolutionary frame of reference (which had clear
congeners in both the scientific positivism of Comte146 and Herbert Spencer’s
social evolutionism)147 provided, for Maine, an important means by which he
could universalise the particular, and overcome the otherwise rather obvious
limits of his comparative philology. It was also, for those such as Westlake, a
means by which they might organize and relate two essentially competing
(and largely empirical) intuitions: one of which being that international law
was necessarily a socially and historically contingent product and largely of
European “origin”; the other being that its historic and contemporary field of
operation was by no means limited to relations between European powers but
encompassed also, treaty-making and other forms of contact with all manner
of sovereigns elsewhere in the world. Whilst the historical particularity of
Europe, when framed in cultural terms, adverted to the existence of a division
between the civilised and uncivilised worlds, this itself provided no means for
the bridging of that gap or of explaining how the latter could be brought
within the frame of the former.148 The idea that the uncivilised periphery
existed in an analogical relationship with pre-historic forms of European
society, and that civilisation (far from being a mere “standard”) was an active
historical process149 of maturation, allowed the non-European world’s spatial
“otherness” to be historicised in thoroughly familiar terms. It could thus serve
not only as a source of historical insight (informing, for example, Westlake’s
investigation into principles of territorial sovereignty150 and his analytical
category of “civilisation” itself)151 but also as a realm of action and inter-
vention in relation to which international lawyers could orient their profes-
sional vocation. On this score, Westlake’s description of his own general
starting point is very revealing. As he was to put it, rather than
“define International Law as the science of the rules prevailing between states,
and to treat as subsidiary the questions of how far those rules are applicable to
semi-sovereign states or to half-civilized or uncivilized populations”,152
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he sought instead
“to put in the front the idea of action, which carries with it the ideas of duty
and responsibility, and to define International Law as dealing with all human
action not internal to a political body. From this point of view the subject is
seen to have real unity.”153
It is thus through the framework of action and responsibility that Westlake
understands the language and practice of European international law to be
capable of being universalised – just as he perceived his own task to be that of
“preparing men for the duties of citizenship”,154 so also he seemed to believe
that those conducting foreign affairs (over whom international lawyers might
have influence) were under a duty to prepare the uncivilised world for the
demands of modern life. This was not an “extraneous” activity, but one
central to his professional vocation as an international lawyer.
Nevertheless, if for Westlake, his professional predecessors fell into error in
their failure to understand that knowledge of the world was a product of
human action and agency and that a properly scientific method necessitated
an orientation to the organized outcomes of thought and consciousness, his
own stance was one that veered towards an uncritical materialism. His
account, ultimately, was that of an observer of a world of anthropological
contrasts in which the cultures, traditions and mores of different societies
could be scientifically organized around, or by reference to, characteristic
forms of law and governance. The primary phenomenological experience of
the social world in other words, came to be apprehended and organized
through the medium of his pre-existent structuring categories of social
knowledge, yet in a way that neither reflected upon the conditions for the
establishment of that frame of reference, nor upon his own performative role
within the account.155 Just as his attention to the cultural particularity of
European social and political life seemed to arise from a concern to locate
legal thought and practice in the material conditions of the real world, so also
did he seem blind to the fact that far from displacing the metaphysical
“universals” which he found so evidently problematic, he was reinserting
them on different intellectual plane: in one direction in an apparent universal
individual psychological will to power or knowledge (in which notions of
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duty and responsibility come to the fore), in another direction in an over-
arching, meta-structural, notion of “culture” (which both divides and unites
the worlds he describes).156 Yet, and perhaps this is the most important point,
the problem is not so much the re-emergence within his work, of certain
universals which we may recognize to be essentialist in character, but the lack
of self-consciousness as to their presence. His attentiveness to the conditions
of social production underpinning international legal thought – which
remains an important theme to this day157 – was thus not problematic simply
because it had the effect of situating Europe at the centre of the universe of
international law, but rather because it failed to reflect upon the way in which
international law itself operated as a discourse that helped to construct those
social conditions upon which it may be said to have depended.
Conclusion: Consequences of the Historical
If, as has been suggested here, the main, and most lasting, contribution of 19th
Century international legal thought was the historicisation of the discipline, it
was an innovation with certain obvious consequences. In one direction it
pushed attention towards the social conditions underpinning its production –
towards, in other words, the temporal and spatial locale in which the
language and practice of international law was understood to have been
generated. As Wheaton was to observe the jus gentium, was “a particular law,
applicable to a distinct set or family of nations, varying at different times with
the change in religion, manners, government, and other institutions”.158 Even
if thus, Montesquieu’s Iroquois might be said to recognize international law, it
was certainly not of the same order. In another direction, the historicisation of
law oriented legal thought away from the kind of abstract rationalisation, or
hypothetical excursus that had been associated with the tradition of natural
rights, and towards various empirical, or experiential, forms of knowledge:
whether that be in terms of the external manifestation of state “practice” and
consent, or in the more elusive “inner” psychology of the juridical conscious-
ness.
On both counts the 1884/5 Berlin Conference was to represent both a
challenge and source of insight. In a very practical sense, it required inter-
national lawyers to find ways of overcoming the obvious tension that existed
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between the self-evident social origins of international law and its field of
operation – in what way could the knowledge of the European origins of
international law, be squared with the need to regulate the burgeoning
relations with native communities in Africa and elsewhere? In another sense,
however, it was also to present an opportunity: the very uncivil character of
African societies seemed to provide vital evidence for the construction of
knowledge of, and about, the emergence and character of European civilisa-
tion. If, following Mill, one could define civilization as the qualities put on by
society as it throws off savage life,159 then attentiveness to the conditions of
savage life could only be revealing. One could construct, in the contrast, both
in a sense of present and past, both an account of what had been achieved and
what left behind. If, furthermore, the conditions of uncivilised life opened the
door on European history, so also did they illuminate the terms under which
European international law might be rendered universal.
For all the critical insights that ensued from this historicised conception of
international law, it was one always vulnerable to its own supersession. In one
direction, the conceptual mooring of the content of law in time and place was
to demand the development of ever sophisticated doctrinal techniques to
govern its applicability in new social settings – latent notions of rebus sic
stantibus, inter-temporality, and desuetude were thus all given particular form
and shape in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. In another direction, just
as 19th Century international lawyers were concerned with creating their own
disciplinary past for purposes of orienting their engagement with the ques-
tions of the day, so they were to become subject to precisely the same fate.
Indeed, their position was ever more precarious precisely because of their
commitment to contextualise their own discourse. So, when in the following
century, scholars of later generations were to return to the subject of Berlin,
they were to recognise in the likes of Westlake, Bluntschli and Wheaton,
nothing other than they were apparent apologists for colonialist enterprise,
misled by the tenets of a redundant creed (positivism), and located in an era of
international law which had been effectively overtaken by subsequent
events.160
However trenchant the subsequent critiques, however, many have arisen in
a form that would have been regarded, by those such as Westlake, as entirely
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recognizable. When, for example, Umozurike was to argue that a principle of
historical dialectics was in play underpinning the process of decolonisation
and securing, for all people, human rights and self-determination,161 West-
lake may well not have disagreed had he been alive to witness the turn of
events. In a similar sense, Bedjaoui’s critique of colonialist international law in
the late 19th Century162 would, no doubt, simply have affirmed the already
solid belief that international law, at any given moment, was not merely
responsive to the social conditions of the day but subject, above that, to a
meta-historical principle of social progress. For all, furthermore, the concern
to express the obsolescence of 19th Century international law through the
medium of a critique of naïve positivism,163 it is clear that this is to miss the
target in at least two ways. In one direction, it is not at all clear that
international lawyers such as Westlake were “positivist” in the sense that it
came to be understood in the early 20th Century. Their world was far more
dependent upon the contingent truths of an elitist juridical sociology, than
upon any formal deductive logic. In another direction, it is clear that many
19th Century international lawyers were equally adept at historicising metho-
dological commitments as much as the substance of law: understanding that
what passed for law at any given moment was, in part, dependent upon
particular historical social formations. That, after all, was the gist of Comte’s
positivism even if he fetishised what he saw to be the era of empiric
rationality.
Even if many of the theoretical and methodological commitments of 19th
Century international lawyers’ understanding of the discipline remained in
place, one thing that subsequently became visible was the apparently ideo-
38 The Invention of a Tradition
161 U. Umozurike, International Law and Colonialism in Africa (1979) 143.
(“Colonialism was once tolerated by international law, which, like everything
else, is subject to the principle of dialectics. Viewed in historical perspective, the
law has been evolving towards perfection. The concrete situation at any
particular time generates a law that takes care of the situation. That law is
the thesis which, lacking perfection, produces its anti-thesis. This represents the
new concrete situation for which the law becomes outmoded and unsuitable.
There is a conflict between the two, and this may be violent … but it may also
be peaceful. A new law then emerges in response to the new situation. This
becomes the new thesis and the dialectic progression continues towards a
perfect law that not only provides for, but secures, the human rights and self-
determination of all peoples. This progression is evident from slavery to
colonialism and then neo-colonialism. The opposition of certain Western States
to anticolonialism is a temporary setback that cannot prevent the march
towards a perfect law.”)
162 M. Bedjaoui, title?.
163 See Alexandrowicz (n. 160).
logical character of the history upon which they had relied. Some, like
Bedjaoui, were content to remain with the story of a European international
law, in the understanding that it had been fundamentally changed as a
consequence of the admission of new states into the legal order. Others, by
contrast, were to seek to isolate the 19th Century (or more narrowly the views
of certain 19th Century international lawyers) as having departed from a
longer-standing, more universal tradition. However viewed, what was appa-
rent was that the articulation of international legal history was no neutral
endeavour, but one filled with meaning and potential. It immediately opened
up various different routes to an engagement with questions of self-determi-
nation164 and to an understanding of the meaning and significance of
decolonisation.165 It was also a means by which, alternatively, optimism
and despair as to the conditions of the contemporary world might be
expressed.166 In the process, however, there is the danger that it might
ultimately take on the appearance of an ideological gloss, no longer capable
of expressing anything meaningful about the past, no longer speaking to
concrete social relations other than in a metaphorical way. The challenge, in
that sense, is to understand the conditions of production of the contemporary
histories of international law.
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